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ACC - anterior cingulate cortex 
BA - Brodmann area  
BOLD - blood-oxygenation-level-dependent 
C - matched controls 
CBF - cerebral blood flow 
DLPFC - dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
EPI - echo planar images 
HG - habitual gamblers 
MCC - medial cingulate cortex  
NAcc - nucleus accumbens 
OFC - orbitofrontal cortex  
PCC - posterior cingulate cortex 
PG - problem gamblers 
SMA - supplementary motor cortex 
SOGS - Southern Oaks Gambling Scale 
VLPFC - ventrolateral prefrontal cortex 
YC - young control
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In everyday life, we need to anticipate and correctly predict future outcomes based on 
the information we are given. These expectations need to be updated regularly and 
processed accordingly. In this study, we investigate the neural correlates of anticipation 
and probability perception during operant conditioning. In addition, we compare 
problem gamblers (PG) and habitual gamblers (HG), with matched controls (C) and 
young controls (YC). Gambling participants (HG and PG) appear to be a group in which 
the anticipatory process may be impaired, explaining their extensive willingness to 
accept future risk (Potenza, 2008, 2013; Miedl et al., 2010; Gelskov et al., 2016). 
Interestingly, most investigations of HG and PG have focused on reward anticipation, 
while this study focuses on loss anticipation. For this purpose, we used the probability of 
a positive punishment (an electric shock) as a manageable and easily controllable loss 
stimulus in the laboratory (Berns et al., 2008). 
 
1.2 Operant Conditioning 
 
In the late 19th century E. Thorndike (1898) was the first to describe operant 
conditioning techniques, a subject that was later extensively studied by B.F. Skinner and 
other behavioural psychologists.  The paradigm of associative learning, also called trial-
and-error-learning, is divided in five different outcome possibilities: positive and 
negative punishment, positive and negative reinforcement, as well as extinction. 
Generally, punishment has been described to decrease behaviour by adding a 
punishment stimulus (positive punishment), for example by the use of an electrical 
shock electrode, or removing an appetitive stimulus (negative punishment). 
Reinforcement, however generally increases behaviour and is based on the adding of a 
positive stimulus comparable to a reward (positive reinforcement), while the 
subtraction of a negative stimulus (e.g. electrical shock) will result in a negative 




Furthermore, extinction may occur when previously reinforced or punished behaviour 
is no longer rewarded by the above reinforcement techniques (Kandel, Schwartz, Jessel, 
1991; Jean-Richard-Dit-Bressel, Killcross and McNally, 2018).  
 
1.3 Loss and Reward Anticipation 
The distinction between loss and reward anticipation at the spatiotemporal level is still 
a matter of research, since both appear to activate similar neural networks (Watson et 
al., 1999; Berns et al., 2008; Knutson and Greer, 2008; Balodis et al., 2012). Furthermore, 
the operant modality of an outcome (positive and negative reinforcement,  positive and 
negative punishment, and extinction) may drive the anticipation process. However, most 
studies use positive reinforcement as a reward stimulus; less frequently, positive or 
negative punishment is used as a loss stimulus. All of the above modalities share 
associations with the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), the ventromedial and dorsomedial 
prefrontal cortex, the nucleus accumbens (NAcc), the anterior, medial and posterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC, MCC and PCC), the insular cortex, the amygdala, and the ventral 
tegmental area as well as with the raphe nuclei (Knutson and Greer, 2008; Liu et al., 
2011; Nakamura, 2013; Macoveanu, 2014; Dugré et al., 2018). Yet, for paradigms 
involving an outcome of positive or negative punishment, i.e., loss anticipation, previous 
reports stress the importance of the medial cingulate cortex (Shackman et al., 2011; 
Dugré et al., 2018).   
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1.4 Prospect Theory 
 
According to prospect theory, subjects tend to overweight small probabilities and 
underweight high probabilities of an outcome in behavioural experiments (Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1979). Among others, Drazen Prelec mathematically formalized the 
weighting function of prospect theory in 1998. The Prelec function describes the 
relationship of decision weight w(p) to loss probability p by an inverted S-shaped 
function. Albeit widely accepted, the biological manifestation of prospect theory, which 
has often been studied using functional imaging techniques, is still a matter of research 
because the theory does not account for all situations, leaving the previously suggested 
linear model of expected utility still in the running (Trepel, Fox and Poldrack, 2005; 
Preuschoff, Bossaerts and Quartz, 2006; Schultz et al., 2008; Hsu et al., 2009; Rudorf, 
Preuschoff and Weber, 2012; Bossaerts and Murawski, 2015). For example, Preuschoff 
et al. (2006) showed a linearly increasing BOLD response to probability in the ventral 
striatum and putamen. This would implicate a processing relating to the expected utility 
hypothesis. However, Hsu et al. (2009) described a nonlinear activation pattern 
according to the probability of a rewarding outcome in the striatum, supporting the 
behaviourally described prospect theory. Moreover, a quadratic relationship between 
brain response and probability comprehension was described (Preuschoff, Bossaerts 
and Quartz, 2006; Tobler et al., 2007; Rudorf, Preuschoff and Weber, 2012). Based on 
the processing of probabilities, these findings add a further dimension to the 
anticipation of an outcome. Most recent studies, however similar in models and in the 
general perception of probability processing, solely investigate reward anticipation, 
while loss anticipation is overlooked.  
 
1.5 Problem Gambling 
  
Gambling disorder is currently the only behavioural addiction listed in the DSM-V 
(2013) and therefore appears as the prototypical model for behavioural addictions. It is 
widely recognised as a problematic public health issue, with substantial personal and 
social costs, poor physical and psychiatric health, elevated suicide rates and other 
comorbidities (Cowlishaw et al., 2012). Currently, estimates of worldwide adult 
prevalence range from 0.2 to 5.3 %, varying across screening instruments and methods 
4 
 
used, as well as accessibility and availability of gambling opportunities (Hodgins, Stea 
and Grant, 2011). While the DSM-V includes individuals to have a gambling disorder 
when they meet 3 or more diagnostic criteria, the term PG may be used as a broader 
term at a lower threshold, also including the previously used terms of pathological 
gambling and disordered gambling (Nautiyal et al., 2017).  
Even though the pathophysiology of PG is not fully understood, research describes a 
distinct phenotype of affected individuals. They include risky decision-making, increased 
impulsive behaviour, increased sensation seeking, increased compulsivity, the 
occurrence of cognitive distortions, as well as an altered reward sensitivity (Rogers et 
al., 1999; Preuschoff, Bossaerts and Quartz, 2006; Balodis et al., 2012; Gelskov et al., 
2016).      
With these concepts in mind, problem gambling appears as a perfect model in which 
individuals frequently show risky and uncertain behaviour in the estimation of future 
outcomes. Concurrently, there is strong evidence for functional differences at the 
molecular and macroscopic levels in brain regions that are relevant to both loss and 
reward anticipation (for review see Potenza, 2008; Miedl et al., 2010; Choi et al., 2011; 
Brevers et al., 2016; Ring et al., 2018). We included HG in our study in an attempt to 
compare their neural response during anticipation with that of the non-gambling 
participants (C and YC) and PG. To our knowledge, comparatively few studies have 
addressed gambling pathology and the concept of anticipation in a single study involving 




1.6 Scientific Questions  
 
Here, we present our findings regarding loss anticipation via positive punishment using 
event-related fMRI. The findings are based on the subjects’ participation in a card game 
that uses an aversive electric shock stimulus and on a behavioural approach inspired by 
our previous publications (Ring and Kaernbach, 2015; Ring et al., 2018). Do we process 
aversive contingencies of decisions in a nonlinear manner, according to the Prelec 
function? How does the brain compute the probability of an outcome? Which brain 
regions process certainty or uncertainty for negative outcomes? How do individuals 
with problematic gambling habits differ in these entities, and can we see a grading 









In total, our sample consisted of 88 subjects who fully participated in the study, and 83 
subjects (mean age (M)= 36.18, standard deviation (SD)= 14.3, Median= 30 years) 
eligible for further analysis. For one participant, the MRI data was lost due failure in data 
handling, another was not eligible for further participation due to excessive alcohol 
consumption and one aborted the experiment because of health problems. For the 
remaining two subjects, data had to be discarded due to extensive head movements in 
the scanner. All participants were German native speakers and had no history of 
psychiatric or neurological disorder. Study proceedings were in accordance with the 
latest revision of the declaration of Helsinki (WMA Declaration of Helsinki - Ethical 
Principles for Medical Research Involving Human Subjects, 2013) and approved by the 
Ethics Committee of the University Hospital Kiel (AZ.: A 106/14).  
We recruited 40 gamblers through advertisement in the local newspaper and flyers in 
the casino. A clinical psychologist conducted a semi-structured interview for impulse 
control disorders, used and written by the Department of Neurology at the University 
Hospital Kiel (Probst et al., 2014). Additionally, participants filled out a self-reporting 
Southern Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS) (Lesieur and Blume, 1987). Based on the two 
measures we were able to divide the gamblers into a group of 22 PG (mean age (M)= 
39.45, standard deviation (SD)= 15.47, Median= 38 years, two self-reported left-handed) 
and 18 HG (mean age (M)= 38.33, standard deviation (SD)= 13.76, Median= 37 years). 
Additionally we recruited 23 healthy, two left-handed, matched C (mean age (M)= 41.43, 
standard deviation (SD)= 15.07, Median= 42 years) and a sample of 20 Y (mean age 
(M)= 25.14, standard deviation (SD)= 3.03, Median= 24 years), both with no previous 





2.2 Experimental Design and Procedure 
All subjects underwent the same general study procedures. Y additionally received an 
electroencephalography to the fMRI discussed elsewhere. The study procedure 
consisted of one or two appointments, depending on whether the first screening 
procedure and demographic data collection were done at home. Participants who took 
part in the experiment completed questionnaires and received a description of the study 
procedure before the appointment.  
Before the start of the experiment, participants gave written and informed consent. They 
answered questions about demographics, neurological and psychiatric disorders, mood, 
alcohol, drug consumption. Subsequently, subjects were screened with a semi-
structured interview for impulse control disorders and SOGS.  Exclusion criteria for the 
study were problematic alcohol or drug consumption (alcohol: more than 1 unit (0.33 l 
beer, 0.2 l wine or 0.02 l hard liquor) per day; other drugs: more than once a week) and 
a history of psychiatric or neurological disorder.  
The present experiment was part of a larger study and also comprised a behavioural and 
EEG-measurement. EEG data with a similar paradigm structure is reported elsewhere. 
To avoid confounding, the order of EEG- or fMRI-measurements was counterbalanced. In 
between EEG and fMRI measurements, subjects answered questions regarding time 
preferences of money gain and played financial risk lotteries for behavioural measure.  
Preceding the start of the Experiment, we determined the strength of electric shocks 
that served as punishment in the paradigm. Attached to the phalanx of the second and 
third toe of the right foot, electric shocks were given via Ag-AgCl electrodes with a 
diameter of 10 mm. The stimulator (Rehastim, HasoMed GmbH, current = 0-126 mA, 
pulse width = 500 microseconds, frequency = 100 Hertz (Hz)) was placed outside the 
scanner and connected to the electrodes by BNC cables approved for usage in the 
scanner. Subjects were told to give feedback about their perception of the strength of the 
shock. Starting at the lowest shock strength, we slowly increased the strength until the 
subject indicated a painful stimulus. To create an unpleasant, but not painful shock 





2.3 Paradigm Structure  
The paradigm is a modified version from Preuschoff, Bossaerts & Quartz (2006). It has 
been successfully used to show differences in skin conductance response depending on 
punishment probability in a prior study (Ring and Kaernbach, 2015; Ring et al., 2018).   
Our paradigm was programmed using Matlab 7.1 (Math Works Inc., Natwick, U.S.A.) and 
the software package Psychtoolbox-3 (www.psychtoolbox.org).  The card game was 
based on a set of 10 covered cards containing all numbers from 1 to 10. The participant, 
as well as the computer drew a card and depending on the bet type, the higher or the 
lower drawn card won. This was all explained to the participant prior to the experiment. 
 
 
Figure 1: Paradigm Structure. After participants actively choose a card, a second card is chosen 
by the game, both in pseudo-randomized manner. Based on the indicating arrow, the lower or 
higher card wins the trial (in this case the participant loses, since the card he chose is lower, and 
the arrow indicates that the higher card wins). We were particularly interested in the 




Each trial began by presenting the covered set of 10 cards in 2 rows and an arrow (↑ or 
↓, with equal frequency) indicating whether the higher or the lower drawn card was 
going to win the trial. Arrow key presses enabled the participants to choose a card from 
the covered set of 10 cards for the bet. If the participant took longer than three seconds, 
the first selected card was chosen. The card was turned around and moved to the centre 
of the screen (mean= 1250ms, range= 1000 – 1500), which revealed the probability to 
win or lose the bet. For instance, a bet type indicating “high card wins” (↑), while the 
participant drew a 10, the win was sure. If instead the drawn card showed a 7 the 
probability to loose was 3/9 (nine cards left, three are higher than 7). Consequently, 
there were 10 different probabilities of losing: p=0, p=0.12, p=0.22, p=0.34, p=0.44, 
p=0.56, p=0.66, p=0.78, p=0.90 and p=1. Subsequently, the computer chose a card from 
the remaining set of cards (after a jittered interval, mean = 7s, range= 5 to 9.5s) and 
placed next to the first card chosen by the participant. It was turned around (duration 
~1000ms) and shown for approximately 6 seconds (range= 3 to 9s). If a trial was lost by 
the participant, he received an electric shock in 50 per cent of the cases at the instant the 
second card was revealed. To avoid habituation, participants were explicitly informed, 
that for the remaining 50 per cent of the cases, the electric shock was absent. For the 
instance of a won trial no punishment followed in a 100 per cent of cases. A control 
question was shown after each trial, asking the subject whether the trial was won or 
lost. An electric shock was applied, if the participant failed to answer the question 
correctly within 3 seconds. Then, a fixation cross was shown for a mean of 4.17 seconds 
(jittered interval, range= 2 to 3s, except in four trials for 15s), followed by the next trial.   
Participants were informed that each trial consisted of a new random order of 10 cards, 
indicating no possibility to know which card would be drawn next. They each played 
three sessions consisting of 30 trials, each lasting 12.68 minutes during which fMRI 
acquisition took place. To ensure enough trials per probability level, we predetermined 
and pseudo-randomized the values of the drawn cards. This resulted in three trials per 




2.4 Financial Risk Elicitation Task 
 
Amongst other behavioural measurements, participants played a paper-based lottery 
task knowing that their reimbursement for participation would be partially based on the 
outcome of the game. The task was proposed by Vieider et al. (2015) and elicits, as 
indicated by the name, a risk assessment during binary monetary lotteries and various 
sure monetary outcomes. It enabled us to separately measure risk attitudes in the gain 
domain, loss domain, calculate probability weights in both domains, as well as the 
degree of loss aversion. For the purpose of this study, we used these probability weights 
for further modelling with the BOLD-contrast. Paradigm structure and further results 
can be found in our previous publication (Ring et al., 2018). 
 
2.5 Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) 
 
Our experiment rests upon the principals of functional imaging of the brain via fMRI, a 
method based on the idea that regional cerebral blood flow (CBF) may reflect neuronal 
activity. Ogawa et al. (1990) were the first to directly describe the effect by using a 
contrast they coined as blood oxygenation level dependency (BOLD). The contrast is 
based on the physical differences of haemoglobin in its magnetic properties. While 
deoxyhaemoglobin is an endogenous paramagnetic agent, haemoglobin is diamagnetic. 
Changes in concentration in the cerebral vascular system then lead to differences in MRI 
signal intensity and provide an indirect measure for brain activity (Kim and Bandettini, 
2006). Although the theoretical formulation was clear, it was not until 2001 that 
Logothetis and colleagues described a direct relationship of the local field potential 
generated by neuronal activity and the BOLD contrast and thereby verified its use as an 




2.5.1 Regression Analysis and the General Linear Model (GLM) 
 
In the present study, fMRI data analysis is based on the principle of model testing. 
Regression analysis offers an approach that rests on the timing and duration of an 
evoked neural response, usually through a controlled event. It assumes that the 
observed data (y) is composed of two sources, a linear combination of regressors (xi), 
together with its variable parameter weighting (βi), as well as the residual noise or error 
in the measurements (ε). The involvement of all factors, held constant throughout the 
experiment, is depicted in the total parameter weight β0  (Huettel, Song and McCarthy, 
2014).  The regressors (xi) correspond to retrieving of memory, visual processing, head 
movement during the scan, age and gender. As for the present study, among others the 
participant’s keypress was implemented in the design. The basic formula for regression 
analysis  
 
y = β0 + β1x1 + β2x2 + … + βnxn + ε 
 
depicts how the single factors contribute to the observed data (y). By the use of this 
model, it is possible to minimize the error term and ideally isolate the contribution of 
the hypothesized evoked response. Eventually, the statistical significance of a regressor 
is determined by the amount of variability it explains (when multiplied with its 
parameter weight) and compared to the amount of variability that is explained by the 




The statistical approach to separate the regressors in data sets with many dependent 
variables is implemented in the GLM. Among others, Friston et al. (1995) proposed the 
implementation of the GLM for MRI usage. The statistical test postulates that a linear 
combination of different model factors, together with uncorrelated noise, contribute to 
the experimental data. Therefore, with MRI data, the unidimensional formula given 
above is replaced by two-dimensional formula given in figure 2. The data matrix (Υ) is 
comprised of time points (n) and voxels (V).  The design matrix (G) consists of time 
points (n) and regressors (M) and specifies how model factors change over time. The 
parameter matrix (β) contains voxels (V) and parameter weights (M), resulting in a 
specification of β-weight for each voxel. At last, the error matrix (ε) depicts the error in 
measurement for the two-dimensional space with time points (n) for each voxel (V). 
While the experimental data is obtained during the experiment, the parameter weights 
and residual error are calculated during the analysis. However, for the design matrix 
regressors must be chosen by the experimenter, based on the previously formulated 
hypothesis. 
 
Figure 2: The basic elements of the GLM based on a figure from Huettel et al. (2014). The data 
matrix Υ comprises the original fMRI data and is dependent on the design matrix (G), the 
parameter matrix (β) and the error matrix (ε). While the simple regression model is based on a 
unidimensional approach, the GLM uses a two-dimensional space to meet the statistical 





2.5.2 Image Acquisition 
 
Images were obtained in the Neurocenter at Kiel University hospital using a 3 Tesla 
whole-body MRI scanner (Achieva; Philips, Best, the Netherlands). A 32-channel head 
coil was used to acquire 310 T2*-weighted whole brain echo planar images (EPI) per 
fMRI session. Repetition time (TR) was 2500 ms, echo time (TE) = 35 ms, flip angle (FA) 
= 90° and field of view (FOV) = 216 x 216 mm.  Each EPI had 38 slices with a 64 x 64 
matrix and a slice thickness of 3mm (plus an inter-slice gap of 0.3 mm). Additionally, T1- 
and T2-weighted structural images were acquired for each subject. 
For the fMRI measurement, participants received ear plugs to protect them against the 
scanner noise. The presentation of stimuli was achieved via a MR-compatible 
VisualSystem from NordicNeuroLab with integrated vision correction. 
 
2.6 fMRI Analysis 
 
For the fMRI analysis, we used Statistical Parametric Mapping 12 (SPM12, Wellcome 
Department of Cognitive Neurology, London, United Kingdom) implemented into Matlab 




Due to unsatisfactory coregistration of EPI images to the bias-corrected T1 image, we 
used a different approach to prepare our data for statistical analysis. First, EPI images 
were resliced and realigned to correct for head motion. Second, we normalized the EPI 
images to an EPI template provided by SPM. The normalized fMRI images were then 





2.6.2 1st Level Analysis 
 
At the 1st level, we modeled the BOLD-signal with a general linear model including 26 
regressors, according to the events of the paradigm. The onset of all cards for selection 
was parametrically modulated by the number of key presses to choose a card (regressor 
nr. 1 and 2). Second, the analysis contained all separate probability levels for losing the 
trial, p(L), revealed at card one as 10 separate conditions (nr. 3 – 12). Next, the onset of 
the second card was divided into 3 conditions: Loss without shock, loss with shock and 
win, each parametrically modulated by the a priori probability of the respective outcome 
(nr. 13 – 18). Additionally, we included the answering of the control question as a 
condition and modulated it with the according keypress (nr. 19 and 20). At last, 
movement parameters from realignment were entered as separate regressors (nr. 21 – 




2.6.3 2nd Level Statistical Group Analysis 
 
For the 2nd level statistical group analysis, contrasts of interest were set up for: 
1) first card shown (weight of 1 for all regressors, independent of the probability 
level)  
2-11) separate contrasts for each probability level to lose p(L)= 0, 0.12, 0.22, 0.34, 0.44, 
0.56, 0.66, 0.78, 0.9, 1.0 (e.g. for the average BOLD-response in trials with the loss 
probabilitiy of 50%, a contrast weight of 1 would be placed at the regressor for 
p(L)=0.5) 
12) low loss probability p(L) = 0.12, 0.22, 0.34 (weight of 1 for each of those 
regressors) 
13) medium loss probability p(L)= 0.44, 0.56, 0.66 (ditto) 
14) high loss probability p(L)= 0.78, 0.9, 1.0 (ditto) 
15) high  versus low loss probability (1 on p(L) = 0.78, 0.9, 1.0, -1 on p(L) = 0.12, 0.22, 
0.34) 
16) high versus medium loss probability (accordingly) 
17) medium versus low loss probability (accordingly) 
18) linear function, based on the ideas of the expected utility theory (Von Neumann 
and Morgenstern, 1944; Knutson and Peterson, 2005; Abler et al., 2006; Tobler et 
al., 2007) (weights see table 1) 
19) quadratic function as a correlate for certainty (Preuschoff et al. 2006) (weights 
see table 1) 
20) Prelec function (1998), based on our behavioural data from the lottery game of 




Table 1: Contrast weights vectors for the linear function, certainty function, and the Prelec 
function according to each probability level to lose p(L) for each 1st level regressor. 
 
We were interested in generalized effects of probability processing during anticipation 
of a negative outcome. The probability weighting functions by Prelec (1998) 
w(p) = exp(-β(-ln p)α) 
were fitted from choice data of PG, HG, and C using non-linear estimation techniques.  
The procedure and results are described in Ring et al. 2018. As we did not find evidence 
for systematic differences in the loss domain, we used the same probability weighting 
function in all groups. The resulting decision weights were used as the weights vector 
for the corresponding BOLD-contrast of the objective probability level p(L), as shown in 
contrast 20. This was compared to the results with linear probability weighting of 
contrast 18.  To increase validity and the size of the sample we extended our statistical 
model with group Y that did not contribute behavioural data for non-linear estimation. 
Previous metanalysis have not shown any differences in risk assessment regarding the 
age (Mata et al., 2011). Yet, to omit confounding of the age disparity of Y compared G, HG 
and C, an ANOVA confirmed no significant group differences in the contrasts of interest.  
  
Probability level p(L)  0  0.12 0.22 0.34 0.44 0.56 0.66 0.78 0.9 1.0 
Linear function weights 
(contrast 18) 




6 2 -1 -3 -4 -4 -3 -1 2 6 
Prelec function 
weights (contrast 20)   




Figure 3: The black line shows the linear function model used in contrast 18 of a monotonical 
increase in function weight, according to the objective probabilitiy.  Similar to Preuschoff et al. 
(2006), certainty of the outcome (1/risk) was implemented as u-shape function (contrast 19). 
The grey line depicts the modelled probability weighting function by Prelec (1998) (contrast 
20), as found in our behavioural data (Ring et al., 2018).  
 
Furthermore, we were interested in the perceptive correlates of uncertainty, based on 
previous assumptions stated by Preuschoff et al. (2006) who depicted this uncertainty 
as a form of risk. They hypothesized a quadratic relationship of reward probability and 
risk (i.e. uncertainty) with minimum values at p(L) = 0 and p(L) = 1, and a maximum 
value at p(L) = 0,5. Due to the nature of our paradigm we expected a similar activation 
for our participants. We extended this relationship to the inverse quadratic relationship 
(U-shape function, minima at p(L) = 0, p(L) = 1 and minima at p(L) = 0.5) to model the 
converse sensation of certainty. Hence, objective probability weights at p(L) = 1 and 
p(L) = 0  should produce a subjective expectation and certainty of the trial outcome 
(certain loss or no loss, contrast 19 and figure 3). Similar to the modelling of the Prelec 
function, we fitted the quadratic function to the fMRI data during the anticipation of the 



















objective probability weights p(L) 




3.1 Task Performance 
 
The participants won in 50.09% +/- 1.7% of all trials and reported the outcome (won or 
lost) correctly in 97.92% +/- 3.23% of the cases. In 22.35% +/- 0.72% of all trials, the 
participants received a shock. For the correctly reported outcome, group comparison 
did not show any significant differences, indicating good overall compliance with the 
paradigm for both the gambling and control groups (chi2-test, p<0.05). 
 
3.2 Southern Oaks Gambling Scale  
 
The SOGS was recorded for the HG, PG and C. It proved to be a valid measure for 
detecting gambling participants and confirmed the outcome of the semi-structural 
interview for impulse control disorders. On the SOGS scoring system (0 = no problem 
with gambling, 1-4 = some problems with gambling, > 5 = probable PG), the participants 
in the PG group scored a median of 8.5 (mean 8.73 +/- 3.9), those in the HG group scored 
a median of 3.5 (mean 3.12 +/- 2.52), and the controls scored a median of 0 (mean 0.22 
+/- 0.6) (Lesieur and Blume, 1987). The Kruskal-Wallis test and post hoc pairwise 
comparison using Dunn’s test revealed significant differences between the groups 







Figure 4: Self-reported SOGS as a valid measure for problem gambling (Lesieur and Blume, 








3.3 fMRI Results 
3.3.1 Identification of Loss Anticipation Effects (contrast 1) 
 
We used event-related fMRI to investigate the neural response during the anticipation of 
a negative stimulus. After revelation of the first card, the participants were able to assess 
the probability of winning or losing the trial and, in case of a loss trial, subsequently 
received an electric shock. This general effect of anticipation resulted in strong event-
related activation in a number of brain regions. The cerebellum, bilateral insula, anterior 
and posterior cingulum, bilateral middle frontal gyrus, bilateral ventral striatum, 
thalamus, amygdala, SMA and fusiform gyrus showed significant BOLD responses 
(Figure 5, Table 2; p<0.05, FWE-corrected).  
We were also interested in the decrease in brain activity during loss anticipation. A 
decrease in BOLD signal intensity was observed in regions such as the anterior and 
medial cingulum as well as in the OFC, the left medial temporal lobe and the precuneus. 
Furthermore, activity in the SMA and the postcentral gyrus was decreased. 
 
 
Figure 5: A: Areas with increased and B: decreased BOLD response after revealing the first card, 
in anticipation of the trial outcome (contrast 1, p<0.05, FWE-corrected). The colour indicates 




Table 2: Anticipation after revealing the first card (contrast 1, p<0.05, FWE-corrected) 
AAL label side X Y Z t-value 
Increase in BOLD-response  
cerebellum R 44 -70 -18 21.6 
anterior insula R 38 22 -10 14.43 
anterior insula L -36 16 -6 13.96 
PCC 
 
/ 0 -26 30 13.02 
L -3 -26 31 11.46 
L -6 -26 35 6.33 
medial frontal gyrus 
 
R 46 28 34 10.96 
R 46 44 16 10.75 
R 48 36 24 10.27 
putamen L -24 16 -1 9.62 
thalamus R 14 -25 4 8.49 
amygdala L -26 0 -16 8.08 
ACC R 2 26 38 8.01 
R 6 32 32 7.45 
putamen R 28 -4 10 7.98 
PCC R 8 -26 34 7.97 
thalamus L -14 -8 2 7.29 
amygdala R 26 0 -18 6.91 
SMA L -6 4 70 5.53 
L -10 14 62 5.19 





Decrease in BOLD-response 
side X Y Z t-value 
postcentral gyrus L -36 -24 54 12.69 
SMA L -8 -8 56 9.61 
SMA R 10  -2 56 7.12 
precuneus R 22 -44 12 7.88 
precuneus L -10 -58 14 6.3 
temporal inferior gyrus L -50 -6 -28 7.35 
OFC L -4 54 -12 7.28 
precentral gyrus R 40 -10 52 6.24 






3.3.2 Linear function, Prelec function and Certainty (contrasts 12, 13, and 14) 
 
Our main interest was in determining which regions are involved in probability 
processing during anticipation of a negative stimulus. Due to our experimental design, 
we were able to finely map 10 events based on the probability of the outcome. 
Accordingly, we followed the activation patterns after revelation of the first card 
corresponding to loss probabilities of 0% (p(L)=1), 12%, 22%, 34%, 44%, 56%, 66%, 
78%, 90%, and 100% (p(L)=10). Based on the behavioural data obtained from the PG, 
HG and C in the lottery game, we modelled a nonlinear function according to Prelec 
(1998) for all groups, depicting activation in brain regions that followed the Prelec 
function. We found that there was a positive correlation with increasing probability of 
losing in the SMA, the ACC (p<0.05, FWE-corrected), the inferior frontal gyrus, the 
supramarginal gyrus and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) (p<0.001, uncorr.). 
In addition, a strong negative correlation with the nonlinear model according to Prelec 
was found for the occipital cortex, the bilateral caudate, the superior and middle frontal 
gyrus, the OFC, the putamen and DLPFC and the frontopolar prefrontal cortex (Tab. 3). 
However, we found that for anticipation of an aversive stimulus, both the linear and the 
Prelec function could explain the brain activation (FWE-corrected, p<0.05, Table 3). A 
paired t-test could not separate the BOLD contrasts adequately, leaving our question 
regarding linear and nonlinear processing partially unanswered. Based on the 
assumption that uncertainty (or risk, according to Preuschoff et al. 2006) or certainty of 
a reward may be depicted by a quadratic function, we modeled a U-shaped function for 
further investigation. No significant results were found in the domain of uncertainty, 
while the negative correlation (certainty = (1/uncertainty)) was correlated with strong 
activation in the bilateral insula, the OFC, the ACC, the PCC, the frontopolar prefrontal 
cortex, and the angular gyrus (p<0.05, FWE-corr., Table 3). Figure 6 shows the 2nd-level 
results in the relevant brain regions; they follow the Prelec function (green and red) or 








Figure 6: Differential model according to the Prelec funtion (positive correlation orange and 
negative correlation green) and quadratic function (cyan) via t-test during probability 
processing for a negative stimulus (all FWE-corrected, p<0.05, except insula*, x y z = 40 24 4).  
Probability levels itemized according to its corresponding regions, thru flexible factorial model. 
The orange and green plots show activation according to the behavioural data of C, HG and PG 
based on Prelec function. An increase to the chance to lose is shown in red including the caudate 
nucleus, superior frontal gyrus, fusiform gyrus and NAcc. Cyan plots present brain regions that 
follow the hypothesis of certainty in a u-shape model and show corresponding activation in the 
Insula and ACC. The respective coloured curves refer to the regressors utilized for modelling.  
 
Table 3:  Anticipation contrast after revealing the first card modelled with Prelec function and 
the U-shape function (FWE-corrected, p<0.05, except marked regions (*) uncorrected, p<0.001 ) 
AAL label side X Y Z t-value 
Activation following Prelec function 
calcarine sulcus 
occipital inferior lobe 
fusiform area 
L 4 -84 -2 11.12  
R 36 -86 -4 10.41 
R 26 -78 -14 10.1 
caudate nucleus 
hippocampus 
R 14 18 -8 8.01  




L -18 10 -14 7.39  
L -10 8 -12 6.64 
L -14 18 -10 6.23 
middle frontal gyrus R 30 10 60 6.78  
superior frontal gyrus 
 
R 26 30 52 6.19 
R 20 18 48 6.1 
superior frontal gyrus 
middle frontal gyrus 
superior frontal gyrus 
L -18 32 44 6.72  
L -34 10 54 5.82 




AAL label side X Y Z t-value 
primary motor cortex R 10 -34 70 5.97 











OFC R 42 50 -8 5.86 
frontopolar prefrontal cortex L -4 60 -2 5.83  
DLPFC L -42 52 -4 5.78 
Activation following the decrease in Prelec function 
SMA R 10 -4 64 5.39 
 L -12 -10 68 5.28 
ACC L -2 16 34 4.87 
 L -8 2 44 4.85 
inferior frontal gyrus, pars triangularis R 40 24 4 4.62* 
 L -36 10 10 4.52* 
supramarginal gyrus L -60 -30 18 4.19* 
DLPFC L -38 40 36 3.43* 
inferior frontal gyrus, pars opercularis L -52 0 2 3.41* 
 R 54 4 -2 3.21* 







AAL label                                                             side        X         Y               
Activation following the U-shape function 
Z t-value 
insula, 
inferior frontal gyrus, 
pars triangularis 
R 30 20 -18 8.05  
R 46 32 -12 7.66 
R 54 22 2 5.6 
insula, 
inferior frontal gyrus, 
pars triangularis 
L -28 20 -14 8.01 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex, 
ACC 
 
L -8 46 20 7.57 
L -8 42 28 7.48 
L -2 56 -4 6 
angular gyrus, superior temporal gyrus 
 
 
L -54 -68 30 6.33 
L -54 -66 28 6.22 
L -56 -52 40 4.81 
angular gyrus, superior temporal gyrus 
 
R 64 -48 20 6.24 
R 58 -50 32 5.14 
MCC L -2 -22 36 5.64 
medial temporal gyrus R 66 -40 -6 5.25 
Superior frontal gyrus, BA 8 
                                             BA 10 
                                             BA 8 
L -12 22 58 5.05 
R 16 60 28 5.04 
R 12 22 60 4.94 
SMA R 12 4 66 4.75 
28 
 
3.3.3 Group Comparison According to Prelec Function. 
 
Next, we were interested in the differential activation of specific brain regions in YC, C, 
HG and PG. As mentioned in our previous publication (Ring et al., 2018), behaviour 
during the lottery game did not show any significant differences in the loss domain. 
However, at the functional level, the t-test suggests that there is an increased nonlinear 
response to the weighting of probabilities of gambling participants (HG and PG) 
compared to non-gambling participants (YC and C) in the bilateral temporal pole, the 
right anterior insula and the MCC (cluster-level, uncorr., p<0.05; peak-level, uncorr., 
p<0.001, Figure 7A). Figure 7B illustrates the focal changes in probability processing in 
the right temporal pole extending into the anterior insula. Changes in temporal lobe 
activity in gamblers during decision-making have been reported by other groups, who 
reported focal abnormalities in clinical EEG recordings (Regard et al., 2003) as well as in 
event-related fMRI (Miedl et al., 2010). In addition, the insula and the cingulate cortex 
were highlighted in the search for the neural substrate of risk assessment in pathological 





Table 4: Group differences for gambling and nongambling participants for probability 
processing according to the Prelec function and to the U-shape function of certainty.      
AAL  label side   X  Y  Z statistic cluster size (in voxels) 
Y+C < HG+PG anticipation processing according to Prelec function 
superior temporal gyrus L -44 6 -18 4.50 71 
 
anterior insula 
R 44 14 -20 4.15  
208 (cluster-level,  
p<0.05, uncorr.) 
R 38 20 -14 3.87  
medial cingulate cortex L -10 -6 36 3.32 3 
Y+C < HG+PG certainty  processing according to U-shape function 
amygdala L -18 4 -16 3.76 19 
PCC R 18 -48 10 3.52 10 
 L -18 -52 12 3.27 1 







Figure 7: Group differences between PG, HG and C displayed in the right temporal pole for the 
Prelec function, extrapolated from behavioural data according to the Prelec function (p<0.001, 
uncorr.).  A: The colour indicates regional t-values according to the reference scale B: Plotted 












With the present paradigm, we were able to map brain activation at 10 different 
probability levels while participants were in anticipation of a negative outcome. We 
found that systematic increases and decreases in activity may depend on the probability 
of losing. This supports our hypothesis of a finely tuned perception of single 
probabilities and partially confirms previous findings regarding that matter (Preuschoff, 
Bossaerts and Quartz, 2006; Berns et al., 2008; Hsu et al., 2009). Furthermore, we 
compared gambling participants to non-gambling participants (Y and C) and we found 
an increased brain response in regions that are active during arousal and anticipation, 
such as the MCC, the anterior insula and the superior temporal gyrus. Finally, we 
investigated how overall loss anticipation is processed; contrary to other suggestions, 
the general perception of loss anticipation did not differ in gambling and non-gambling 
participants.  
 
4.1 Loss Anticipation (contrast 1) 
4.1.1 Division of Reward and Loss Anticipation 
 
First, we measured the general effect of anticipation for a negative stimulus (i.e., main 
effect of anticipation) after the revelation of the first card during a trial, disregarding 
single probability units. Without any significant differences at the group level, we 
included all 83 participants in calculating the overall BOLD response statistics. Our 
experiment revealed strong activation in the ACC, the anterior insula, the putamen, the 
thalamus and the SMA. Furthermore, we found activation in the MCC, the PCC, the DLPFC 
and the anterior prefrontal cortex, as well as in hippocampal and parahippocampal 
areas extending to the fusiform gyrus. The former regions, in particular, have been 
shown to be active during both reward and loss anticipation (i.e. anticipatory affect), 
while the latter regions seem to define the valence or quality of the outcome, i.e., loss 
anticipation (Knutson and Greer, 2008; Liu et al., 2011; Dugré et al., 2018). Regions that 
are active during loss and reward anticipation have routinely been reported to 
contribute to affective functions in the brain. For example, tasks that elicit positive 
emotions appear to activate these regions (Knutson et al., 2001; Chandrasekhar et al., 
2008; Suardi et al., 2016); however, negative stimuli such as viewing fearful and angry 
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faces, social conflict, listening to sad music or receiving a painful stimulus also seem to 
do so (Koelsch, 2010; Palermo et al., 2015). This connection has frequently been 
suggested to stem from a shared connection between positive and negative emotions in 
the salience network and the corticolimbic circuit that integrates the uncertainty-
induced arousal experienced in an unknown situation (Menon and Uddin, 2010; Liu et 
al., 2011).  
The ACC, anterior insula, putamen, thalamus and SMA are most often reported to be 
solely active during loss anticipation, a finding that suggests the existence of a separate 
network that may define the specific valence of the outcome. In particular, the BOLD 
response in large parts of the cingulate cortex, insula, amygdala and prefrontal areas 
suggests a complex network of loss anticipation. A meta-analysis by Dugré et al. (2018) 
showed that the MCC was predominantly active during loss anticipation, and this was 
confirmed in the present study. The MCC has been suggested to serve as a goal-directed 
hub for information about incoming punishment that is then used to guide further action 
induced by negative stimuli (Shackman et al., 2011). Shackman et al. (2011) also showed 
a notable shift of activity from the medial OFC during reward anticipation to the 
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC) in loss anticipation. In the present study, 
however, we found increased activation in the DLPFC rather than in the VLPFC. This may 
be due to the difference in paradigm structure; in our study, the previous necessity to 
choose  a card may have increased the activation of the DLPFC, which has been linked to 





4.1.2 Group Differences in Loss Anticipation 
  
When comparing loss anticipation (contrast 1), we could not show any significant 
differences between gambling (PG and HG) and non-gambling (C and Y) participants. 
Several reasons could account for this outcome. Specifically when taking into 
consideration the previously suggested concept of duality in reward and loss 
anticipation. Here we can assume that differences related to gambling and non-gambling 
may only be present during reward anticipation. During loss anticipation, however, the 
brain response appears to be similar to that of healthy individuals. Problem gamblers 
have often been reported to have functional changes in the ventral striatum and the 
medial OFC, while areas that are vital for loss anticipation do not underlie significant 
changes. This hypothesis is corroborated by findings at the behavioural and neural 
levels. For example, individuals with gambling disorders were found to show a 
decreased physiological brain response in the ventral striatum and the ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex during winning (Reuter et al., 2005). Furthermore, Balodis et al. 
(2012) found decreased activation in the ventral striatum during reward anticipation 
but not during loss anticipation. To our knowledge, only one study reported slight 
decreases in brain activation in pathological gamblers during loss anticipation, 
specifically in the caudate nucleus and the temporal pole (Choi et al., 2012). However, 
these group differences did not survive FWE-correction at a cluster size of 8 and 7 
voxels. Based on the previous literature and given the statistical power of the present 
experiment, we therefore propose that at least during loss anticipation, gamblers may 





4.2 Probability Weighting According to Behavioural Models (contrasts 12-14) 
 
A central question in the present study was the processing of probability levels during 
loss anticipation. Does brain activation follow the predictions of prospect theory as the 
probability of positive punishment or negative reinforcement increases? Is there a 
neural correlate of the sensation of certainty? To investigate this matter, we modelled 
the behaviourally measured probability weighting function according to Prelec (1998) 
using our BOLD data during loss anticipation (Ring et al., 2018). A few studies have 
attempted to determine whether the function is linear, following the expected utility 
model or nonlinear, thus following the Prelec function (Preuschoff, Bossaerts and 
Quartz, 2006; Berns et al., 2008; Hsu et al., 2009; Rudorf, Preuschoff and Weber, 2012). 
However, none of these studies arrived at a definite conclusion. In the present study, we 
found that increasing and decreasing probability levels influence the cognitive 
representation and perception of individual probability levels (Figure 6). In addition, we 
could show a pronounced activation of certainty for an outcome (without valence, U-




The prospect theory stresses the overweighting of small probabilities and the 
underweighting of high probabilities, while the prelec function is the fitted formalization 
of this theory. We used the behavioural data as regressors and found an increase in 
brain activity in response to increased probability of losing, mainly in the MCC, SMA, 
anterior insula and DLPFC. These findings are consistent with the suggestion that the 
MCC acts as a hub for incoming negative stimuli, integrating information as a basis for 
further action in anticipation of a shock (Shackman et al., 2011). The increased 
activation in the SMA may represent the suppressed or unsuppressed planning of motor 
functions for possible punishment avoidance. Furthermore, with increasing probability 
of positive punishment, we could show activation of the anterior insula; this may be 
attributed to its role during arousal (Wu et al., 2014; Dugré et al., 2018). Involvement of 
the insula in both reward and loss anticipation, as well as its nonlinear response to 
probability, was shown previously (Berns et al., 2008; Knutson and Greer, 2008; Liu et 
al., 2011; Dugré et al., 2018).  
Interestingly, we found a strong negative correlation of activity in some brain areas with 
increased probability of losing. Striatal components and their dopaminergic projections, 
namely the NAcc, caudate nucleus, putamen, OFC, and DLPFC, showed a strong inverse 
correlation with the behavioural model (Figure 6, red). This is consistent with the recent 
literature regarding probability perception, specifically for anticipation of positive 
reinforcement. Hence, we assume that with a decrease in punishment probability, 
activation follows the increasing probability of not suffering the loss-associated 
outcome. The behavioural advantage of avoidance of negative outcomes can be called 
negative reinforcement. We therefore infer that negative reinforcement triggers brain 




A similar response can be seen in the reward paradigm proposed by Hsu et al. (2009). 
Those authors used a paradigm containing 6 rather than 10 probability levels. In their 
investigation, they found nonlinear activation in the striatum, cingulate gyrus, motor 
cortex and cerebellum. In comparison, we used a card game similar to that used by 
Preuschoff et al. (2006). The latter paradigm involved the presentation of the aim (to 
have a higher or lower card) and the subsequent presentation of two cards, while the 
temporal segment between the presentation of the two cards constituted the time of 
anticipation. Preuschoff et al. found distinct activation of the ventral striatum and the 
putamen; however, the activation increased linearly with the increase in the probability 
of winning. The linearity may therefore reflect the physiological equivalent of a linear 
perception of probability and contradict the idea of a physiological correlate following 
prospect theory. 
To our knowledge, only one study has investigated the prospect theory at the neural 
level using an evoked response (positive punishment), similar to the one used in the 
present study. That study used a loss anticipation delay-conditioning paradigm with 5 
probability levels and revealed a nonlinear response in relevant regions such as the 
anterior insula, the superior temporal gyrus, the cingulate gyrus and the inferior parietal 
gyrus (Berns et al., 2008). As in the present study, the authors found a U-shaped 
activation, which may resemble a form of certainty, as well as the assumed S-shaped 
model according to the prospect theory. Furthermore, they showed a significant positive 
correlation of the increased probability of a negative stimulus with activity in the 
superior frontal gyrus, which has been shown to contribute to anticipatory signaling 
(Hsu et al., 2009; Seidel et al., 2015). Similar to the present experiment, a nonlinear 
negative correlation with probability was found in the ACC, which has been suggested to 
be involved in the integration of probability weighting (Berns et al., 2008). Meta-
analyses of loss and reward anticipation emphasize the presence of a shared 




Similar to Berns et al. (2008), we observed a U-shaped dependence of activation on 
probability level (Figure 6). This may reflect a sensation of certainty regarding the 
outcome of the trial. In both studies, the activation involved the insula and the superior 
temporal gyrus. In addition, we found activation in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, 
the ACC and the MCC. These regions have been suggested to contribute greatly to 
anticipatory cognition and decision-making (Liu et al., 2011; Shackman et al., 2011; 
Dugré et al., 2018). Based on these results, we propose that the five regions mentioned 
above regions may integrate the probability of an outcome, giving the individual 
feedback for use in future situations during decision-making.  
The insula has been suggested to play an integrative role in the anticipation process, and 
some groups have found that it is involved in the perception of certainty (Preuschoff, 
Quartz and Bossaerts, 2008; Seidel et al., 2015). Interestingly, Preuschoff et al. (2008) 
found activation of the anterior insula during risk prediction (i.e., uncertainty) and risk 
prediction error (i.e., certainty), but they separated the neural response both spatially 
and temporally. They argue for a distinction in anticipatory signaling in the anterior 
insula. On the one hand, it may mediate a learning process for future probability 
predictions, and on the other hand, it may contribute to an anticipatory process before a 
potential risk is realized. Unfortunately, our data does not allow such a temporal 
division; however, taken together, the distinct activation observed in the anterior insula 
during loss anticipation (see previous paragraph) and the association of activation with 




4.3 Group Differences 
 
Finally, we were interested in whether non-gamblers and gamblers show differences in 
brain activation during probability weighting. In our previous publication based on the 
behavioural data of the present study, we did not find group differences in the loss 
domain during a time preference paradigm (Ring et al., 2018). Nevertheless, we 
hypothesized that changes occur in the brain response, since there are assumptions that 
propose a pathological neurophysiology in multiple cognitive domains, such as 
anticipation, response inhibition, conflict monitoring, decision making, and cognitive 
flexibility (Choi et al., 2011; for review see Moccia et al., 2017). In fact, we found 
evidence that the temporal pole and the anterior insula present increased activation in 
gambling participants during the processing of probabilities according to our 
behavioural model based on the Prelec function (1998). This was true when we 
compared non-gambling (Y and C) and gambling (PG and HG) participants and was still 
present in the comparison of C and PG (p<0.001, uncorr.). The temporal pole, as an 
extension of the superior temporal gyrus and the anterior insula, was linked to gambling 
in previous studies. Choi et al. (2011) described decreased activation in the temporal 
pole and anterior insula when individuals with a gambling disorder were compared with 
controls. They argue that the decrease in activity in the anterior insula may be due to the 
function of that region as a mediator in the emotional processing of adverse events. This 
does not fit with our results, however the present approach was profoundly different, 
and the differences may explain the divergence in the results. While the contrast 
employed in our study may detect the difference in the evolution of perceived 
probability levels, Choi et al. compared loss anticipation in general, similar to our 




A different group used the Iowa Gambling Task to test PG poker players during 
monetary decision making. During card selection, gamblers showed mildly increased 
bottom-up connections from the ventral striatum to several cortical regions, including 
the superior and middle temporal gyrus (Brevers et al., 2016). The authors interpreted 
their findings as indicating the presence of a physiological correlate of increased 
salience during sensory processing. These findings show that there are changes during 
the processing of loss probabilities in gambling participants. However, the differences 
appear stronger for reward anticipation, specifically in the striatum and related 




For the present study, limitations arise predominantly from the experiment structure. 
Due to the design of the paradigm, there was no possibility to compare the two entities 
of reward and loss anticipation. Future research could therefore include a reward 
stimulus in the design, creating an opportunity for direct comparison. Furthermore, the 
50% chance of receiving a punishment stimulus blurred the measured emotions of risk 
and uncertainty. Risk is predominantly modelled in a U-shape curve in paradigms that 
apply a 100% risk of receiving a punishment, while uncertainty is often modelled in a 
strictly randomized manner. By informing the participants of the 50% chance to receive 
a punishment stimulus beforehand, the present study may have merged both risk and 
uncertainty. Furthermore, the implemented probability weighting was based on an 
unrelated task and performed outside the scanner. For future research a probability 
weighting based on the choices during the paradigm could increase the explanatory 








Answering the questions from the introduction, our results paint a picture of discrete 
regional probability processing with increasing loss anticipation in the SMA, the MCC 
and the anterior insula. Conversely, there was increased activation with increased 
probability of evading a loss in the fusiform gyrus, the NAcc, the caudate nucleus and the 
superior frontal gyrus. Additionally, we found that other brain regions, including the 
insula, the OFC and the ACC, show a U-shaped pattern of activity, which we interpreted 
as a function of certainty.  
Furthermore, we compared the gambling (PG and HG) and non-gambling (C and Y) 
participants, and we found evidence for an increased activity in the superior temporal 
lobe, the insula and the MCC of gamblers during probability prediction according to the 
Prelec function. This indicates that anticipation of adverse events may be mediated in 
different ways in gamblers and non-gamblers.  
Moreover, we found a distinct pattern of activation during loss anticipation and found 
activation in regions commonly described with affect and arousal: the anterior insula, 
the ACC, the putamen, the thalamus and the SMA. Consistent with the recent literature, 
the neural pattern observed in those brain areas during loss anticipation is closely 
shared with the pattern associated with reward anticipation (Dugré et al., 2018). 
However, the valence of loss is determined by the involvement of the MCC, the PCC, the 
DLPFC, the anterior prefrontal cortex, the hippocampus, the parahippocampus and the 
fusiform area. Interestingly, no differences in the general anticipation of negative stimuli 
could be found in gambling and non-gambling participants, suggesting an exclusive 







Objective: With this study, we aim to arrive at a better understanding of the neural 
mechanisms underlying the anticipation of losses due to unpleasant electric shock 
stimuli. According to prospect theory – currently the most important descriptive model 
of decision making under uncertainty in economics – subjects overweight small 
probabilities and underweight high probabilities. Here, we analyzed to what extent 
prospect theory is manifested in biological data. Does the human brain process aversive 
contingencies of decisions in a nonlinear manner according to the probability weighting 
function underlying prospect theory? Which brain regions process certainty or 
uncertainty regarding an outcome regardless of its valence? How do individuals with 
problematic gambling habits differ in these entities? 
Methods: The present study included a total of 83 participants (22 problem gamblers, 
18 habitual gamblers, 23 age-matched subjects and 20 young control subjects). Each 
participant was evaluated by psychologists through a semi-structured interview and the 
self-reported Southern Oaks Gambling Scale. The study participants engaged in a card 
game in which unambiguous situations with various risk levels for aversive events 
(unpleasant but not painful electric shocks) were created. Apart from neural responses 
during anticipation of an aversive event, our paradigm allowed us to measure how 
neural activity during expectation is modulated by the probability of the outcome. 
Furthermore, we used the participants’ attitudes towards risk to account for the 
subjective evaluation of probabilities, as suggested by prospect theory.  
Results: We confirmed existing knowledge about the active network during anticipation 
of aversive events in a large sample. Specifically, in response to our experimental 
stimuli, the BOLD (blood oxygen level dependent) signal increased in the anterior and 
medial cingulate cortex, the anterior insula, the amygdala, the thalamus and the medial 
frontal regions. Based on economic studies and on our previous behavioural results, we 
modelled the expected outcomes according to uncertainty and prospect theory. With 
increasing chances of avoiding punishment, we found that the BOLD signal increased in 
the orbitofrontal cortex, the striatum, the hippocampus, the precuneus, and the 
posterior cingulate cortex. Conversely, with increasing certainty of a positive or negative 
outcome (U-shaped from most certain loss to no loss), we found activation patterns in 
the medial superior frontal cortex, the anterior cingulate cortex, the anterior insula, the 
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frontopolar prefrontal cortex and the angular gyrus. Furthermore, we found evidence 
for group differences in cerebral activation in the bilateral superior temporal pole, the 
anterior insula and the medial cingulate cortex during the perception of distinct 
probability levels according to the nonlinear probability weighting function. 
Interestingly, these regions are relevant both in loss anticipation paradigms and in 
functional imaging studies describing pathological gambling. 
Conclusion: Our results support the concept that the neural response to anticipation is 
determined by its valence. Although it has frequently been reported that gamblers and 
non-gambling individuals show differences in reward anticipation, during loss 
anticipation gambling participants do not differ in their neural activation patterns. We 
also tested whether specific regions of the brain follow a nonlinear brain response 
according to prospect theory and the certainty of an outcome. When their BOLD 
responses during probability perception were compared, non-gambling and gambling 
individuals did show differences in the perception of probabilities. This provides new 
evidence that simultaneously occurring cognitive processes are represented in different 
sets of brain regions. Specifically, neurobiological correlates of loss anticipation were 
found in areas known to be involved in dopaminergic reinforcement learning and in the 
corticolimbic circuit, while regions known to subserve decision making, conflict 
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